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 Beyond the Rift in Cyber Strategy 




Over the last five years, interest in cyber-defense has grown in earnest, particularly after the 
cyberattacks against the Estonian government in spring of  2007, the discovery of  the GhostNet 
network targeting the Dali Lama’s diplomatic offices in 2009, and the Stuxnet worm’s disruption of  
the Iranian nuclear program in 2010. As a result, the US government has made substantial moves in 
the last two years towards the institutionalization of  cyber-defense:  
• The appointment of  Howard Schmidt as Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Obama 
Administration in December 2009;  
 
• The implementation of  a formal partnership in October 2010 between the Department of  
Homeland Security and the Department of  Defense, which specifies the responsibilities of  each 
organization; 
 
• Finally, the creation of  the US Cyber Command in May 2010, a joint organization including 
components from all military services (the Army Forces Cyber Command, the U.S. Navy Fleet 
Cyber Command, the 24th Air Force, the Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command). 
Despite these bureaucratic efforts in the White House and in the interagency process, this article 
argues that there remains a lack of  consensus in Washington, particularly within the Department of  
Defense, on threat assessment in cyberspace and its military implications. A stark intellectual rift 
between “alarmists” and “skeptics” still prevails. As a result, this elementary battle has led to 
dysfunction in the institutional response to cyber-threats and jeopardizes the implementation of  an 
effective military posture in cyberspace. Consequently, we need to reassess the relevance of  
cyberspace as a distinct military domain. 
To that end, this article aims for a middle ground between these opposing views, supporting the idea 
that cyberattacks are more than just a technical nuisance, but less than an existential threat to US 
national security. As of  today, they remain a valuable, but not decisive, tool of  military action. At the 
operational level, it means that cyberspace is not an independent domain. In other words, while 
warfare in the air is different from warfare on the sea, it is possible to have one without the other. 
But warfare in cyberspace must be accompanied by warfare in one of  these other domains to lead to 
physical effects. As a result, this paper recommends a comprehensive integration of  cyberattacks 
(which are precisely not autonomous cyberwarfare) into a joint analysis of  military battles. Because 
pundits have been focusing on the broad geopolitical implications of  cyberattacks, the strategic 
literature lacks a systematic and detailed campaign analysis of  these acts. This joint analysis would 
frame cyberattacks as offensive or defensive military engagements in the process of  a larger naval, 
air, or land campaign. Based on the findings of  this research, cyberattacks should be considered a 
subset of  an offensive, a means of  denial rather than a means of  punishment. They aim at attaining an 
intermediate goal for the attacker.   
Consequently, as long as cyber operations are launched by actors with broader objectives than 
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 exclusively dominating channels of  communication, there is legitimate doubt over whether a 
cyberwar could occur without an extension to other traditional military domains.  
As a necessary word of  caution, this article explicitly excludes cases of  cyber-espionage whose aim 
differs from cyberattacks: while the former tries to steal and exploit information from an enemy (eg, 
the daily attempts of  intrusion into the servers of  the Defense Department), the latter are defined 
here in strict military terms to directly or indirectly destroy or disrupt targeted infrastructures. In 
other words, cyberattacks should be narrowly considered at the battle level as a component of  the 
forces used by the attacker. 
This article has three sections. The first section assesses the fundamental divide of  the strategic 
debate on cyber-defense. I show that although many efforts have been dedicated to understanding 
the strategic dimensions of  cyberspace, a rift prevails between two camps: one predicts the 
emergence of  cyberwarfare while the other characterizes such events as no more than cases of  
‘cyber-annoyance’. In the second section, I explain that this protracted clash of  views comes mainly 
from the use of  two misleading analogies for cyberwarfare: nuclear warfare and strategic bombing. 
The article then demonstrates in a third section that a middle way to implement a military policy in 
cyberspace can be found by understanding cyberattacks as a subset of  broader military operations. 
To that end, I employ the tools of  campaign analysis to make an appraisal of  events such as the 
cyberattacks against Georgia prior to its August 2008 war against Russia. Finally the article’s 
conclusion explores the implications of  my findings for future research. 
 
Cyberwar or cyber-annoyance? The fundamental divide of  the strategic debate 
In spite of  obvious efforts (such as the 2009 60-day Cyberspace Policy Review, led by Melissa Hathaway, 
former Senior Advisor to the US Director of  National Intelligence), the Obama administration has 
not tackled the fundamental dispute over the strategic implications of  cyberattacks. Currently in 
Washington, two opposing views compete with each other: the alarmist voices (and indeed the most 
vocal ones) who predict the advent of  cyberwarfare as a revolutionary form of  conflict, and the 
skeptical voices who acknowledge the “annoying” vulnerabilities of  US civilian and military 
infrastructures but who do not see such attacks as the constituents of  a pattern for potential new 
major conflicts. 
This divide has existed since the middle of  the 1990s, when the US Department of  Defense and 
military-related think tanks started issuing reports and articles on the strategic implications of  
cyberspace. Although the cyber realm and information warfare have significantly evolved since then, 
the terms of  the divide have been noticeably constant all along. Starting in the 1990s, an impressive 
proportion of  the strategic studies literature focused on the so-called “Revolution in Military 
Affairs”, of  which the optimal exploitation of  electronic interfaces was only one of  many 
components. From the futurists Alvin and Heidi Toeffler, and their famous “third wave” 
characterization of  the information revolution,1 to the iconoclast colonel Richard Szafranski and his 
fuzzy concept of  “neocortical warfare”, people inside the Defense Department started to read and 
write about warfare in the information age.2 This led to the now famous but still-ambiguous concept 
known as “information warfare”.3 
The starting point for emerging conceptual debates could be marked in 1993, when John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt, two researchers at the RAND Corporation, published an article titled 
“Cyberwar is Coming!” in the journal Comparative Strategy.4 Behind this emblematic title, the two 
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 scholars argued that cyberwar - defined as a war centered on information flowing through electronic 
interfaces - was to provoke a fundamental bottom-up review of  military organizations.  
Yet straight away, ideas about a war in cyberspace sounded at best farfetched, at worst spurious. 
After all, was it not a term - cyberspace - taken from a science fiction book?5 Some researchers saw 
this conflation of  concepts and ideas as an eventual march toward the establishment of  a coherent 
field of  studies. For instance, the late Laurent Murawiec, a scholar from the Hudson Institute, 
observed in 2001 that  
As presently constituted, the field seems to cover a bewildering array of  subsets: 
psychological warfare, deception, cyberwar, critical information protection, computer 
network attack, computer network exploitation, netwar, and more. The confusion is normal. 
When people started building automobiles, hundreds, if  not thousands of  attempts were 
made which bore the name of  “automobile”, and other names too. The variety of  shapes, 
methods, materials, solutions proposed to the various problems of  a self-propelled vehicle, 
was equally bewildering. It took time and experience, much competition and failures, to 
winnow, to rationalize, to weed out. We can only expect the same to hold true in the field of  
“information warfare” as opened up by the digital revolution of  the last quarter century.6  
But contrary to Murawiec's faith, ten years later, the confusion still remains. Moreover, this decade-
long divide has deepened since 2007 as cyber-defense has been put at the forefront of  the political-
military agenda following the cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, the use of  cyberspace during the 
military campaign between Russia and Georgia in 2008, and lastly the Stuxnet worm that targeted 
the Iranian nuclear plant in Natanz in 2010. 
Counted among the alarmist voices are recently retired US officials such as Richard Clarke, former 
Special Advisor to the President on Cybersecurity, and Mike McConnell, former Director for 
National Intelligence. Mr. Clarke explains in his book, Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security 
and What to Do About It, that what states “are capable of  doing in a cyber war could devastate a 
modern nation”.7 In February 2010, Mr. McConnell explicitly titled a much-discussed op-ed from 
the Washington Post, “How to win the cyberwar we're losing”.8  
More specifically, these voices frequently compare the current debate on the scope of  cyberwarfare 
with the age of  nuclear strategy in the 1950s. For instance, Mr. McConnell asserts that “the cyber-
war mirrors the nuclear challenge in terms of  the potential economic and psychological effects”.9 
Following this comparison, they call for a doctrine of  cyber-deterrence. Moreover, General Kevin 
Chilton, the head of  US Strategic Command, supports the idea of  a combined deterrence based on 
nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and cyberwarfare capabilities.  
In a US Air Force journal, Chilton wrote that “the deterrence impacts of  such uncertainty over the 
potential impacts of  a cyberspace attack would be a function of  the nature of  the attacker's goals 
and objectives. A competitor's concerns about unintended consequences could enhance the effects 
of  our deterrence activities if  it wishes to control escalation or fears blowback from its cyberspace 
operations”.10 This fairly resembles the Cold War's MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) doctrine. 
Originally emerging at the end of  the Kennedy administration, MAD was a doctrine that assured 
that a full-scale use of  nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would effectively result in the 
destruction of  both the attacker and the defender.11 Can such an argument be replicated into 
cyberspace? So far, it is hardly conceivable.  
As a matter of  fact, one year prior to Chilton's article, a suggestion from a US military officer was 
already raising similar questions. In May 2008, Colonel Charles Williamson from the US Air Force 
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 wrote a widely criticized article in the Armed Forces Journal on the potential build-up of  military 
botnets that could be used for offensive purposes.12 For Williamson,  
America needs a network that can project power by building an af.mil robot network 
(botnet) that can direct such massive amounts of  traffic to target computers that they can no 
longer communicate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of  metal and 
plastic. America needs the ability to carpet bomb in cyberspace to create the deterrent we 
lack.13 
In other words, Williamson was not only acknowledging an on-going arms race in cyberspace, he 
was advocating it. But Williamson was only adding another argument to the idea that cyberspace in 
itself  is a new and separate domain of  warfare. This idea had grown in earnest several months 
before his article, when Estonia experienced cyberattacks against its governmental servers. Following 
the attacks, the US Secretary of  the Air Force, Michael Wynne, stated that “Russia, our Cold War 
nemesis, seems to have been the first to engage in cyber warfare”.14 Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonian Minister 
of  Defense, went further, evoking “the first unnoticed third world war”.15  
But even while these voices are urging for a new posture toward cyberwarfare, skeptical voices—
among them Howard Schmidt, the current Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Obama 
Administration—are  vigorously opposing their conclusions. Although such thinkers recognize the 
need for improving information system security, they understand the concept of  cyberwarfare as 
deeply flawed. For instance, Schmidt stated during an interview at the RSA Security Conference in 
San Francisco in March 2010: “There is no cyberwar [...] I think that is a terrible metaphor and I 
think that is a terrible concept”.16 
All in all, both postures (the alarmist and the skeptical) fuel the debate in Washington, both in the 
government and in think tanks. This rift has two consequences: first, the US military still remains 
uncertain precisely what cyberwarfare, cyberconflict or, indeed, any other term given to describe the 
political use of  attacks in the cyberspace actually stands for. Second, this tension logically affects the 
credibility of  the national security architecture, leading to official disagreements on the threat level 
(e.g. Howard Schmidt stating publicly that ‘there is no cyberwar’17) or even interservice rivalries (the 
Air Force having claimed since 2005 to be the one to ‘fly and fight in cyberspace’18). But the rift 
between these two antagonistic views can and should be overcome. This is the aim of  the next two 
sections, starting with how the confusion is produced by two analogies—nuclear warfare and 
strategic bombing—that too often frame the debate on cyber military policies. 
 
The problems of  current analogies for cyberwarfare 
Balancing the equation between the alarmists and the skeptics of  cyber-threats requires a critical 
examination of  the terms of  the debate, and more specifically of  the frequently used analogies. The 
study of  new phenomena in international affairs is often dependent on analogical reasoning. 
Analogies provide guideposts on the assumption that new issues can be understood within the 
framework of  older, more familiar ones. Regarding cyberspace, two analogies have been extensively 
used, both explicitly and implicitly: cyberwarfare as nuclear warfare, and cyberwarfare as strategic 
bombing. Each is misleading. 
The analogy with nuclear warfare is often used to emphasize the low level of  existing knowledge on 
the strategic implications of  cyberattacks. Within that logic, the same could be said of  the early 
nuclear literature published in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, no one denied the potentialities of  
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 nuclear weapons, as they were dramatically demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But equally, no 
one could accurately appraise how nuclear forces and their diffusion would alter the balance of  
power in the context of  the Cold War. It took years and some risky and bold analysis from Bernard 
Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter to build a more coherent understanding of  nuclear 
strategy.19 People needed to “think the unthinkable”, to cycle through numerous ideas and concepts 
in order to finally build a coherent intellectual framework for nuclear policy analysis.20  
The comparison with cyberwarfare, however, cannot be stretched further. While nuclear weapons 
remain the single most lethal asset available to armed forces, in terms of  military applications, 
cyberattacks do not have any direct lethal effect. In terms of  force employment, the cyberattacks 
perpetrated in recent years have tended to be used in support of  combined operations (the Russia-
Georgia war of  2008) with low-intensity effects, or to achieve a modest political outcome (the 
intimidation of  Estonia in 2007). By contrast, nuclear warfare—at least since the widespread 
acceptance of  the MAD doctrine—has been understood to carry the real risk of  escalation to a 
Clausewitzian absolute conflict that shifts the strategic calculus of  conventional warfare. Deterrence 
in the nuclear field is relevant because of  its absolute character. Cyberattacks can disrupt the 
command and control systems of  an enemy, but they do not annihilate his population. 
Furthermore, computer scientists underline that technical limitations prevent the victim of  a 
cyberattack from identifying their attacker in cyberspace, which results in an inability to deter a 
potentially anonymous aggressor. Indeed, with the current state of  technology, cyberattacks deny the 
technological possibility to trace their origins. The use of  botnets implies the hijacking of  computers 
that can be located in other countries, or even on other continents. Therefore, authorities do not 
have any certainty with which to attribute an attack to a terrorist organization or to a state. For 
instance, cyberattacks on Estonia in spring 2007 were partly originating from computers physically 
located in California. Therefore, for all these reasons, cyberattacks can barely be compared to 
nuclear strikes. 
The second analogy refers to strategic bombing, a theory of  coercion based on the exploitation of  
massive air attacks that emerged at the end of  the First World War and that has, for much of  the 
period since, constituted a dogma of  the US Air Force in its claims for the independent effectiveness 
of  airpower. As Caroline Ziemke wryly observed: “Strategic bombing is not mere doctrine to the 
USAF; it is its lifeblood and provides its entire raison d'être. Strategic bombing is as central to the 
identity of  the Air Force as the New Testament is to the Catholic Church”.21 In other words, the fact 
that strategic bombing is USAF's raison d'être demonstrates how the US armed forces can acquire 
technological obsessions as a product of  their strategic culture, even when the empirical evidence 
does not systematically support their position. 
The presumed similarity between cyberattacks and strategic bombing has already led several pundits 
to argue for an explicit cyberpower doctrine, recalling directly the long and intractable debate over 
the independent effects of  airpower.22 Institutionally, this analogy can be explained as a product of  
the US Air Force's sunk investment in cyberspace expertise. But more particularly, this analogy 
emphasizes the persistently technology-centered nature of  US strategic culture.23 
In other words, the analogy is based on the idea that technological capabilities (whether air strikes or 
cyberattacks) can compel the enemy to do our will without ever launching a massive and costly 
ground offensive.24 But in spite of  certain thinkers’ enduring faith, there is little evidence that 
strategic bombing has ever decisively determined victory in war.25 Regarding cyberattacks, there is 
even less proof  that they have been decisive in any military context.  
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 The best example of  this misleading analogy is the contemporary debate surrounding the Stuxnet 
attack against the Iranian uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. After rumors spreading in the 
summer of  2010, the authorities in Tehran acknowledged in November that the control systems of  
its nuclear facilities had been targeted by a cyberattack that caused significant physical damage. There 
is clear evidence from the reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency that the 
cyberattacks targeting the centrifuges delayed for about a week Iran’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, 
Stuxnet did not decisively stop Tehran’s ambition, it only hindered the pace of  its fulfilment.26 Thus, 
the exaggerated statements on Stuxnet and the advent of  cyberwar per se come from this same belief  
about strategic bombing and its decisiveness. 
Consequently the analogy is not applicable, not strictly because cyberattacks lack the lethality of  air 
strikes (they actually could resemble air strikes in terms of  disruptive effects), but because the 
analogy is biased by the fundamental assumption that strategic bombing can be decisive and so 
cyberattacks could as well. 
Although the errors vary for the respective different comparisons with nuclear warfare or strategic 
bombing, one common conclusion can be drawn: as of  today, cyberattacks do not amount to a 
distinct field of  warfare with its own rules and processes. Both analogies should therefore be 
avoided if  we are to get the conceptual framework for the analysis of  cyberattacks right. Therefore, 
we need to strictly understand the history of  the phenomenon within the context of  military 
operations. 
 
A middle way for a military posture in cyberspace 
The political science literature dedicated to campaign analysis can provide precious insights on how 
to articulate a robust strategic analysis of  cyberattacks that avoids both the fads of  
“cyberwarmongers” and the reductionist arguments of  “cyberskepticals”. Campaign analysis looks 
at the operational level of  military activity by combining an appraisal of  the objectives, the military 
balance (quantity, quality, joint capabilities), the terrain, the duration of  the campaign and its 
evolution (breakthrough, maneuver).27 Going beyond a simple compilation of  military resources and 
technologies, this methodology allows us to get a better grasp of  how these assets are used during the 
campaign, what Stephen Biddle calls the “force employment” factor.28 
So far, campaign analysis has rarely looked at cyberattacks. The most obvious reason is the lack of  
sufficient available data (due to the classification issue) that would be needed. Nevertheless, based on 
the first lessons learned from the cyberattacks released to the public (mostly about the Estonian and 
the Georgian cases), cyberwarfare cannot be described as an independent field of  warfare. There 
cannot be war in cyberspace like there are instances of  wars in the air, on the seas, or on land. 
Cyberattacks can only be conceived as a component by-product of  a larger military campaign. In 
other words, a cyberconflict has to be defined as a proxy conflict aimed at attaining an intermediate 
goal for an attacker, thereby functioning as a subsidiary addition to conventional kinetic military 
operations. Cyberattacks are means of  denial, not of  punishment: they can block an enemy's ability 
to use its information systems as part of  their war effort, but they are rarely designed to achieve 
political outcomes in their own right by inflicting an unbearable cost on the defender.29 
On that matter, the lessons learned from the cybercampaign against Georgia during the war in 
Russia in August 2008 are instructive. Georgia experienced early cyberattacks in late July, including 
an attack on the presidential website on July 19. Due to a distributed denial of  service attack, the 
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 website remained unavailable for twenty-four hours.30 After a two week pause, cyberattacks targeting 
Georgian government and media websites started by late August 7 following President Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s decision to attack South Ossetian separatist forces that night. But the wave of  attacks 
substantially increased on August 8, the day the Russian armed forces entered Georgia, when 
cyberwarriors began to block and deny access to Georgian govermental websites, and moved on to 
expand the list of  targets to include financial institutions.31 
Experts from the US Cyber Consequences Unit (US CCCU) surmised that the attackers were 
civilians recruited through electronic social networks. However, more significantly, the authors of  
the report concluded that there was a clear convergence between the Russian armed forces' 
campaign and the hackers' actions: “The organizers of  the cyber attacks had advance notice of  
Russian military intentions, and they were tipped off  about the timing of  the Russian military 
operations while these operations were being carried out”.32 Consequently, this illustrative case of  
cyberwarfare clearly demonstrates the integration of  such practices into a larger military campaign. 
By themselves, cyberattacks function as proxy components of  a strategic offensive. Indeed, one 
could argue that the use of  cyberattacks during the conflict between Russia and Georgia pointed 
away from the use of  autonomous cyberwarfare in itself, and instead illustrated that there are 
combined operations that can exploit cyberattacks in the same way that theater air campaigns have 
been performed for decades.  
Interestingly, this also happens to be the way that Chinese strategists conceive the exploitation of  
cyberspace. In spite of  misleading speculations regarding Chinese capabilities (mainly a consequence 
of  the alarm generated by the best-selling book Unrestricted Warfare, written in 1999 by PLA colonels 
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) does not conceive cyberspace 
as an autonomous military domain.33 Rather, the Chinese military has explicitly adopted a posture 
including the concept of  “integrated network electronic warfare”, which aims at controlling the flow 
of  information in the adversary's system and at maintaining the PLA's information superiority on a 
traditional, physical battlefield. Moreover, the seminal Chinese documents, The Science of  Military 
Strategy and The Science of  Campaigns, both underline the decisive role of  information superiority in air 
and sea warfare.34 Such strategic thought clearly integrates cyberattacks into classic military 
campaigns. In short, even thinkers in the United States' principal future great power rival only see 
cyber as a subcomponent of  modern conventional conflicts. 
In spite of  all the political exaggerations regarding cyberwarfare, modern cases (Estonia in 2007, 
Georgia in 2008, the revelations over a so-called 'GhostNet' operating against Tibetan authorities) 
display evidence that there are no truly independent or even autonomous cyberwars per se.35 In all of  
these instances, cyberattacks were a component by-product of  a larger campaign (political 
intimidation in the Estonian and Tibetan cases, military intervention in the Georgian case).  
As a result, our assessment renders debate on the future of  deterrence in cyberspace irrelevant. Of  
course, this does not mean that hackers cannot inflict significant damage that could severely disrupt 
the vital infrastructure of  a country but so too, still, could bombers and tanks. Even worst-case 
scenarios involving cyberattacks do not suggest that the United States or other major powers could 
be severely coerced, let alone existentially threatened, by such cyberattacks alone.  
The belief  that disruptions in cyberspace could defeat a country is flawed—and dangerous. The idea 
that cyberwarriors could become the principal combatants of  a future war without physical 
implications remains science fiction à la William Gibson. It might be the role of  strategic futurists to 
explore such narratives, but policy-makers that need to base analysis on present-day objective facts 
have to acknowledge this evidence: taking into account recent international events and known 
Strategic Insights • Spring 2011 Volume 10, Issue 1 10
 technological trends, cyberattacks cannot be compared to nuclear warfare. The actual analogy that 
should be explored, if  such analogical reasoning is cognitively necessary to conceptualize and 
understand the emergence of  cyberattacks, is electronic warfare. It may be less strategic and more 
technical, but it is also more relevant. 
◆ ◆ ◆ 
Policy-makers and military planners should neither overestimate the strategic scope nor 
underestimate the operational effectiveness of  cyberattacks. The protracted battle over their 
significance has not only intellectual implications but policy ones as well. The inability of  the Obama 
administration to bridge this decade-long gap between these two distinct views of  cyber-defense 
extends the institutional dysfunction into the current system. Alarmists and skeptics are dispersed in 
all levels of  the chain of  command (in the White House, the Department of  Homeland Security, the 
Department of  Defense, the National Security Agency or the Department of  State) without anyone 
prevailing. As a result, final decisions are still taken as a product of  bureaucratic tactics, rather than 
on the back of  cautious strategic threat-assessment.36 
Therefore, getting the strategic appraisal right should be the priority when designing the relevant 
military posture. As I explained in this article, there is a middle ground between dismissing the 
military significance of  cyberattacks and overestimating their reach. Cyberattacks certainly represent 
a cost-effective tool to support classic land, sea and air campaigns, and consequently their military 
added-value should be assessed in the context of  joint operations. But they do not represent a new 
and revolutionary class of  military operation in their own right. 
In the coming years, the challenge will be precisely to measure this added-value, whether in offense 
or in defense, and at both the national armed forces level and the joint international level. Policy 
makers and strategic analysts should then increase their efforts on the exploitation of  two techniques 
helpful to adapt a military posture in cyberspace: 
• First, thorough campaign analysis of  recent cyberattacks can provide precious assessments of  
the “force employment” factor in cyberspace and its effectiveness on the battlefield. It will 
permit the US military to shift its focus from cybertechnology as the decisive assets to a posture 
based on an optimal exploitation of  these weapons in the context of  combined operations to 
achieve strategic objectives; 
 
• Second, scenario-based exercises should look at how US armed forces can operate in a degraded 
cyber environment.37 Exploring specific contingencies where cyberattacks would disrupt the 
conduct of  an operation, these exercises should not only involve national servicemen but also 
the militaries from NATO members as well as from traditional allies (Japan, South Korea). This 
will provide new evidence and ideas on how to integrate these engagements as an additional 
contributory element to a broader military campaign.38  
This adaptation process could well represent the key to both defensive resilience and offensive edge 
when confronting future cyber-threats. 
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